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NOTES

NONPROFIT COMMERCIALIZATION
UNDER BAYH-DOLE AND THE
ACADEMIC ANTICOMMONS
The tragedy of the anticommons describes a scenario in which
early "upstream" patenting of minor discoveries or research tools
negatively impacts future "downstream" discovery.' Under this
scenario, barriers to research and invention arise when a single, novel
discovery relies on multiple patented inventions or research tools. The
increased transaction costs resulting from upstream patenting may
impede or even prevent downstream research, invention, and
patenting. The tragedy of the anticommons is the topic of much
scholarly debate, as it has central relevance to the biotechnology
industry, which relies heavily on patents. Moreover, the pyramidal
nature of biomedical research is such that future research builds upon
past research, and new inventions stem from prior discoveries.
One of the greatest contributors to upstream patenting is the
Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980, which encourages nonprofit research
institutes and universities to patent and commercialize inventions
resulting from federally funded research. The purpose of the
Bayh-Dole Act is to increase the public's access to federally funded
research by enabling the transfer of intellectual property rights from
academia to industry where they can be commercialized and made
more readily available to the public. 2 Bayh-Dole allows nonprofit
I See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovations? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 701 (1998).
2 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200211 (1994).
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research institutes and universities to retain the patent rights to these
inventions, thus encouraging academic researchers to patent earlier
and more frequently.
In addition to promoting upstream patenting in the academic
setting through the conferment of intellectual property rights,
Bayh-Dole implies a duty to commercialize inventions for the benefit
of the public and promotes relationships between nonprofit and
university researchers and industry.3 These resulting commercial
relationships can have both positive and negative effects on academic
research. For instance, patent rights are granted to incentivize
researchers to pursue patentable discoveries, and the monetary
rewards resulting from partnerships with industry confer such
incentives. The trade-off is that academic researchers are no longer
perceived as non-competitive, cerebral academics. In many instances,
academic-industrial partnerships are built during early stages of
research and development, making the academic researcher a direct
competitor within his partner's field. For instance, a researcher at a
university who is developing a synthetic hormone funded by a large
pharmaceutical company is in direct competition with other
companies that are developing or selling hormone-based therapies.
Being perceived as a competitor within the industry may have
serious consequences for a researcher under the tragedy of the
anticommons scenario. Two empirical studies have tested the putative
tragedy of the anticommons as it relates to the biotechnology
industry. Both studies identified certain "working solutions"
employed by researchers confronted with upstream patents that
enable them to work around or simply ignore patents while pursuing
their research goals. "Working solutions" include licensing, inventing
around third-party patent claims, ignoring or willfully infringing
patents, going offshore to use patented technologies without
licensing, creating and using public databases, and challenging
patents in court.4 The nonprofit and university researchers commonly
ignore or infringe third-party patents, which they justify under the
theory of a "research exemption."
The "working solutions" that academic researchers utilize are
unique to the nonprofit/academic setting and rely on the universal

3 Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh-Dole Act:
An Implied Duty to Commercialize 1 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished essay), available at
http://www.cimit.org/coi_part3.pdf.
4 John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical

Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen &

Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
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perception of academic researchers as non-competitors.5 Although
these studies failed to identify clear impediments that upstream
patenting imposes on downstream research, it is unclear whether this
is because the surmised barriers do not exist or whether they exist and
are easily surmounted by "working solutions" that the industry
utilizes in response to upstream patents. 6 For-profit firms traditionally
do not regard the nonprofits as competitors and typically do not
enforce their patent rights against nonprofit researchers because of
negative press and lack of recoverable damages. This benign neglect
may change as nonprofits and universities increase patenting and
commercialization of competing inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act.
Thus, commercialization under the Bayh-Dole Act may undermine
the "working solutions" that nonprofits and universities have adapted
to deal with upstream patenting of research tools, resulting in a
tragedy of the anticommons that uniquely affects nonprofits and
universities.
This Note addresses the implications of post-Bayh-Dole
commercialization on the tragedy of the anticommons as it
specifically applies to nonprofit and academic research. Part I of this
Note provides a review of the debate concerning the potential harms
associated with upstream patenting in biotechnology. Section A
reviews the current debate surrounding upstream patenting and the
tragedy of the anticommons theory. Section B summarizes the
empirical studies that have sought to address the effects of upstream
patenting on downstream invention in biotechnology.
Part II provides a review of the evolution of upstream patenting of
biotechnology in academia and industry in the United States. Section
A summarizes the effect of the market on the compartmentalization of
biotechnology research and development in academia and industry
prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act. Section B addresses the
effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on biotechnology research, patenting,
and commercialization in academia and the advent of nonprofit
research institutes.
Part III analyzes the effect of upstream patenting in biotechnology
on research conducted in nonprofit institutes and academia compared
with for-profit firms. Section A summarizes the "working solutions"
that researchers have employed to surmount barriers caused by
5 Id.
at 324-329; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 45 (2002), available

at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf (surveying professionals within the
biotechnology industry to examine the effects of upstream patenting on the biotechnology
industry post-Bayh-Dole).
6 Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 322.
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upstream research-tool patents. Section B discusses how these
"working solutions" vary between nonprofit institutes and academia
compared with for-profit firms.
Part IV discusses the implications of the Bayh-Dole Act on
commercialization of the nonprofit sector. Section A addresses the
implications of commercialization in regard to nonprofit competition
with for-profits firms. Section B discusses the implications of
nonprofit commercialization for "working solutions" to upstream
research-tool patenting.
I. WHAT ARE THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM PATENTING
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY?

A. The Debate:Biotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons
1. Incentives of the Patent System
A patent confers a short-term monopoly over a novel invention to
incentivize research and promote public disclosure of the invention.
There is a trade-off between restricting the public's use of the
discovery and providing an incentive to people to invest time, effort,
and money in the research leading to the invention. Additionally,
patent rights provide downstream incentives by promoting investment
in commercialization of the invention, making it more widely
available to the public. A patent grants the holder the right to prevent
others from practicing the patented invention during the term of the
monopoly; however, a patent holder may sell a license to make or sell
the invention. There is frequent debate about how best to insure that
patent rights create incentives without unduly limiting the public's
use of new technology. This debate is particularly significant in the
area of biotechnology because of the nature of biomedical research
and the increasing trend toward patenting upstream inventions or
research tools. One concern is that prolific patenting of upstream
inventions could have a detrimental effect on future research and
discovery.
2. Tragedy of the Anticommons
"Tragedy of the commons" describes the phenomenon by which
people overuse resources held in common because individuals have
no incentive to conserve.7 According to this theory, a resource is
7

See Garrett Hardin,

The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC.

1243 (1968)
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prone to overutilization when too many owners possess a privilege of
use, but no one has a right to exclude others.8 In considering the
trends in biotechnology patenting, a converse phenomenon has been
hypothesized. Heller and Eisenberg first introduced the metaphor
"tragedy of the anticommons" to describe the scenario in which a
scarce resource is prone to underutilization when multiple owners
have the right to exclude others from the resource, and no one
possesses an effective privilege of use. 9 In this scenario, privatization
and proliferation of patent rights may lead to significant barriers to
future research, rather than increased incentives.
This scenario is not unique to the biotechnology industry, but
Heller and Eisenberg claim that the field of biotechnology is
particularly vulnerable to this tragedy of the anticommons1 t It is
common knowledge in the field of intellectual property law that
patents matter more to the biotechnology industry than to any other
because reverse engineering allows competitors to copy discoveries
such as genes, molecules, and drugs without undue effort. 1' Thus,
researchers in biotechnology cannot rely on trade secrets to preserve
their market share as they can in other industries. Researchers hoping
to commercialize their inventions are encouraged to patent early and
often. The Bayh-Dole Act gives researchers at academic and
nonprofit institutes incentives to patent all upstream discoveries and
research tools, including genes, expressed sequence tags, receptors,
reagents, devices, transgenic animals, and cell lines. This proliferation
of patents on research tools creates a patent thicket.12 In addition, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit have extended the scope of patentable
subject matter to include novel, nonobvious, and useful research
13
tools.

(explaining that examples of this phenomenon include overpopulation, pollution, deforestation,

and extinction).
8 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 698-99.

9 Id.
10Id. Market failure, resulting from a breakdown of the patent system and failure to
license, has occurred in several industries, such as radio technology and aviation, while in the
semiconductor industry the market has evolved through cross-licensing to promote future
discovery and commercialization. See Walsh et al., supranote 4, at 290.
1 See generally A. ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY (2001); Walsh et al.,

supra note 4, at 287; W. M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 7552 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper, 2000).
12 Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 287; see Scott lyama, Comment, The USPTO's Proposal
of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1223, 1225
(2005).
13 lyama, supra note 12, at 1225; Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 290; see also Diamond v.
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The evolutionary nature of scientific discovery is particularly
apparent in biomedical science, where future discoveries build upon
past discoveries.14 Each fundamental scientific discovery acts as a
building block and is often the result of piecing together earlier
discoveries to create a novel invention. Progress in biomedical
research has become even more cumulative in nature with advances
in molecular biology and genomics, automated sequencing,
microarray technology, and high-throughput screening of small
molecules.' 5 Finally, in applied biomedical research, patent holders
are unlikely to fully exploit their patented discoveries, and licensing
becomes even more critical to promote downstream applications. For
example, multiple researchers may pursue a drug targeted at a
particular molecule implicated in a disease. If the molecule is
patented and unlicensed, drug development may be limited to a single6
avenue of research that may not yield the most effective treatment.
The lack of substitutes for certain discoveries, including patented
genes, receptors, model systems (i.e., transgenic animals or cell lines),
techniques (i.e., polymerase chain reaction [PCR]), or the inability to
invent around a critical
patent may result in additional barriers to
17
invention.
downstream
Under Heller and Eisenberg's model, complex barriers to research
and invention arise when a researcher needs access to multiple
patented inventions or technologies to conduct research leading to a
single, novel discovery. Barriers to downstream research result from
increased transactions, costs necessary to obtain the rights to use the
necessary research tools. Transaction costs increase with the number
of required tools and the number of patent holders with whom
licenses must be negotiated. Increased costs can slow or impede
discovery, and where the sum of the costs exceed the expected return,
avenues of research may be left unexplored, leading to loss of
inventions.' 8 Thus, upstream patenting of research tools creates a
disincentive or barrier to downstream research. Under this theory,

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
14 lyama, supra note 12; see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, PatentPools, andStandardSetting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 119 (2001).

15 See Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 289-290; Jurgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A
Historical Perspective, 287 SC. 1960, 1960-62 (2000); R. Henderson et al., The
Pharmaceutical Industry and the Revolution in Molecular Biology: Interactions Among
Scientific, Institutional,and OrganizationalChange, in SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP:
STUDIES OF SEVEN INDUSTRIES 267 (D.C. Mowry & R. R. Nelson eds., 1999).

16See Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 291.
P7See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 698-99.
1s lyama, supranote 12, at 1226-29.
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research tools will continue to be developed, but these tools will be
under-utilized, and the short-term patent monopolies on these tools
may actually impede applied research in areas such as drug discovery
and clinical research.
The tragedy of the anticommons describes several types of barriers
to downstream research raised by a plethora of upstream patenting.
First, many upstream patent owners are public institutions with
limited resources for absorbing transaction costs and limited
competence in commercial bargaining.1 9 Therefore, increased
transaction costs associated with obtaining licenses to use upstream
patents are likely to exceed the ultimate value of a given downstream
discovery. 20 These licensing transaction costs are likely to arise early
in the course of research and development when the outcome of a
project is still uncertain, and it is not clear that value of downstream
products justifies the trouble of overcoming the anticommons.2'
Second, in an ideal market, patent holders and potential licensees
would agree on the value of a patent, thus facilitating licensing
negotiations and utilization of the patented invention. However,
patent holders may overestimate the value of their patents and
demand more than the probabilistic value of the patent. Conversely,
patent holders may undervalue the patents of others and reject
reasonable offers. Patent holders' overestimating the value of their
patents or undervaluing the patents of others' leads to inefficient
-bargaining, which interrupts negotiations for user rights and impedes
downstream research.23 Lack of substitutes may also increase the
leverage of certain patent holders, leading to a holdout situation in
which a single upstream patent blocks downstream research.24 This
may occur if the patent holder is unwilling to license or if
licensing costs are prohibitive. In addition, if numerous licenses are
need to pursue an avenue of research, the rights involved may cover a
diverse set of techniques and tools, and it may be very difficult to
compare the values of these patents. Patent thickets arise because of
widely distributed, concurrent, and sometimes overlapping exclusive
rights. 25 Researchers wanting to use multiple upstream discoveries or
tools must navigate through a thicket of patent rights and licensing
agreements, where they run into barriers in assembling the rights for
19Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 700.
20 lyama, supra note 12, at 1227.
21 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 700.
22 Id. at 701.
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Shapiro, supra note 14, at 119; lyama, supra note 12, at 1225.
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each research tool required for a particular research project.26 This
barrier becomes even more difficult to surmount when different types
of institutions hold the necessary patents rights.27
Third, the heterogeneity of interests, resources, agendas, and
business norms among academic and commercial rights-holders may
increase transactions costs. 28 This heterogeneity may complicate the
emergence of standard licensing terms and lead to costly case-by-case
negotiations.2 9 When owners have conflicting goals, each can use his
rights to block the strategies of the others, and they may not reach an
agreement for the development of downstream research.30 More
subtle conflicts in agendas arise between patent holders pursuing
applied, end-product development and focusing primarily on
upstream research. Differences in their tolerance for transaction costs
may further complicate the emergence of informal licensing.
Academic researchers may rely on outdated or obsolete public
domain technologies and may find themselves losing grant
competitions or unable to scientifically compete. 3'
Patent owners are also likely to differ in their willingness and
ability to infringe the patents of others, leading to disparate
motivations in cross-licensing. Generally speaking, nonprofit and
academic researchers may infringe with impunity. Use of patented
invention in an academic or small start-up environment may be
inconspicuous unless published. Therefore, researchers may only
pursue licenses once a patented invention is determined essential to
downstream invention. This leads to licensing of only a fraction of the
patents that are being infringed.32 Commercial patent owners may be
more reluctant to sue academic researchers, compared with
commercial researchers, because of limited remedies and the potential
for negative publicity. Cultural differences in nonprofit settings may
make nonprofit or academic patent holders more tolerant of patent
infringement than large pharmaceutical companies.33
Lastly, long delays in the patent filing and prosecution process
may lead to substantial uncertainty at the time of licensing as to the
lyama, supra note 12, at 1225.
Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 290. Different types of institutions include
pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology firms, nonprofit institutes, and government laboratories.
Each institution has its own agenda, goals, and funding restraints that may not be compatible
with the licensing requirements of other types of institutions.
28 Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 1, at 700.
26
27

29

30

Id.
Id.

31
32

Id.

33

Id. at 700-01.

Id.
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scope of patent rights that will ultimately issue.34 Corporations and
universities may enter into licensing agreements based on pending
patent applications. These licenses are based on putative rights that
may be larger than the actual rights that the PTO eventually confers,
and these overlapping patent filings may compound the obstacles to
developing new inventions. 35 Additionally, the use of reach-through
license agreements that grant the patent holder rights in subsequent
downstream applications may lead to upstream patent holders with
overlapping and inconsistent claims on downstream discoveries.
Thus, according to Heller and Eisenberg, in the field of
biotechnology, there are numerous, overlapping barriers to
downstream research that upstream patenting may raise. Furthermore,
within the biotechnology field, nonprofit and academic researchers
face unique barriers based on limited funding and legal and
commercial experience. This is somewhat balanced by the willingness
and ability of nonprofit and academic researchers to infringe patents
with relative impunity. These researchers are insulated by the cultural
norms surrounding the academic community that are in contrast with
the regulated environment of for-profit researchers.
B. Empirical Studies: Effects of Research Tool-Patenting in
Biotechnology
1. The Walsh Study
The National Academy of Sciences commissioned a study on the
effects of upstream patenting in biotechnology that was first
published in Science36 and later expanded in a second paper.37 The

study sought to determine whether access to upstream inventions that
are essential to future innovation actually create barriers to
downstream research and patenting. 38 The Walsh study focused on
two major questions: (1) do multiple research-tool patents interact to
impede downstream innovation?; and (2) does restricted access to an
upstream technology impede downstream innovation? 39 Walsh et al.
interviewed professionals within the biotechnology industry. 40 These
34 Id. at 699.
35 ld.

36 John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the PatentProblem, 299 Sc. 1021 (2003).
37 Walsh et al., supra note 4.
38 Id. at 291.
39 Id. at 331.

40 Id. at 292. Walsh et al. conducted seventy interviews with IP attorneys, business
managers, and scientists from fifteen biotechnology firms and ten pharmaceutical firms;
scientists and tech transfer officers from six universities; patent lawyers; and government and
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interviews focused on changes in patenting, licensing, the relationship
between pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology ventures, and nonprofit
research institutes, and how policy changes have affected firm
behavior.
In summary, Walsh et al. reported that, although searching for
third-party patents has become more time consuming and expensive,
and the number of licenses that must be obtained for a research
project has increased in the past twenty years, that number is
usually manageable. 41 Approximately one-third of respondents
claimed to be increasing their patenting of gene sequences, assays,
and other tools in response to the increased patenting in the industry
at large, in order to ensure freedom to operate. 42 However, Walsh et
al. found no evidence of an anticommons. Respondents reported that
negotiations over access to necessary IP rights, royalty stacking, or
excessive licensing fees rarely led to projects' cessations.43
Furthermore, respondents reported relatively few cases in which
concerns regarding the costs related to third-party patents preempted
researchers from pursuing a specific project. Walsh et al. reported
several examples where restricted access to one critical research tool,
such as a drug target, was an impediment to research. However,
numerous scientific studies report using these tools despite restricted
access, raising a question as to whether the patents serve as true
impediments.4
Interestingly, Walsh et al. found that researchers have managed to
limit the negative effects of research-tool patents on research and
innovation through a variety of "working solutions. '' 5 In addition to
traditional practices of licensing and inventing around third-party
patent claims, respondents admit to commonly ignoring patents,
going offshore to use patented technologies, creating and using public
databases, and challenging patents in court.4 6 Apparently, these
strategies effectively enable researchers in the biomedical sciences to
surmount any barriers that upstream patents pose.

trade association personnel.
41 Id. at 294-95.
42 Id. at 295-96; see also M. R. Henry etal., DNA Patentingand Licensing, 297 SCI. 1279
(2002) (providing a comprehensive statistical overview and survey).
43 Walsh et al., supranote 4, at 298.
44 Id. at 305-09.
45Id.at 322.
46 Id.at 324-29.
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2. The Straus Study
In a similar study, "Genetic Inventions and Patent Law," which the
German government commissioned, Professor Joseph Straus
addressed the effects of upstream patenting in biotechnology. 47 The
responses elicited in the Straus study were generally in line with the
Walsh study. There was no evidence suggesting an anticommons.
There was little evidence of breakdowns in negotiations over IP rights
or evidence that biomedical research has slowed. Patents on research
tools had no discernible effect on the cost or pace of research in
Germany. Respondents claimed that intellectual property rights did
not unduly hamper research cooperation agreements.4 8 Exceptions
were the exclusive licensing of certain research tools so that the
licensee could benefit from a period of exclusivity to capitalize on his
investment and the costs that royalty stacking imposed. 49 All
respondents indicated that they were vigilant in examining the
validity of their competitor's patents and determining if their research
projects are likely to infringe third-party patents.
Straus also suggested several reasons for the lack of effect of
upstream patenting on downstream research, including the difficulty
in detecting infringement and the prevalence of licensing in the
biotechnology industry in Germany.50 German interviewees also
reported "working solutions," which allow them to continue to
innovate relatively unimpeded. These solutions included licensing
negotiations, inventing around the patent, ignoring or infringing
patents, challenging patents, moving offshore, and putting
innovations in the public domain. 5' Access to patented research tools
did not appear to be a barrier to downstream research as long as firms
were able to take advantage of these working solutions.
Neither the Walsh study nor the Straus study supported the
existence of an anticommons in the field of biotechnology. It remains
unclear whether Heller and Eisenberg's anticommons exists only as a
theory or is in fact present and surmountable via "working solutions"
devised within the industry itself. This question ceases to be moot
47 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., supra note 5, at 46. The results of the study
were reported at the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology workshop, "Genetic Inventions,
IPR, and Licensing Practices," on January 24-25, 2002. Strauss interviewed four large
pharmaceutical companies, nine small and medium-sized specialist biotechnology companies,
seven public research institutions, and five genetic testing centers in Germany.
48 Id. at 47.
49 "Royalty stacking" refers to the need to take out licenses under numerous patents,
resulting in a series of royalty payments to the respective patent holders that may be crippling to
the user.
so ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 5, at 46.
51 Id. at 50.
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when researchers are potentially faced with an insurmountable
anticommons resulting from the breakdown of current "working
solutions."
II. PATENTING BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Academia andIndustry: Pre-Bayh-Dole
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a clear division of research
between large for-profit companies that conducted applied research
focused on drug development, and nonprofit research institutions,
including government labs, universities, research institutes, and
teaching hospitals, which did curiosity-driven basic research. 52 Clear
institutional boundaries between nonprofit and commercial research
did not prevent a significant movement of ideas, information, and
scientists between nonprofit and for-profit research institutions;
however, legal constraints and a strong set of social norms served to
limit interactions between the two sectors. 53 Most commercial
pharmaceutical research was conducted in-house, and almost all firms
were large and fully integrated for drug discovery, clinical
development, regulatory affairs, manufacturing, and marketing. 4
Nonprofit researchers concentrated largely on fundamental science
and filed very few patents.55 Research funding was driven by
peer-reviewed competition for grants on the basis of scientific merit
and the reputation of individual researchers.
Prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act,5 6 the federal
government sponsored pre-market "upstream" research through
education and research grants to researchers at academic and
nonprofit institutes and encouraged broad dissemination of resulting
52 lain M. Cockburn, Blurred Boundaries: Tensions Between Open Scientific Resources
and Commercial Exploitation of Knowledge in Biomedical Research 4 (Jan. 10-11, 2005)
(unpublished essay), available at http://advancingknowledge.com/drafts/cockburn%20%20blurred%20boundaries.doc.
53 id. at 5 ("Many drug companies invested significant resources in 'blue sky' basic
research, and specialist for-profit research boutiques generated and sold technology to large
firms. Public sector institutions conducted screening programs for drug candidates, and many
academic researchers had close financial and contractual links with drug companies through
individual consulting arrangements and institutional research grants and contracts.").
54 Id. at 4. Drug discovery was primarily based upon large-scale, random screening of
compounds rather than directed at specific targets. Thus, the large firms had limited
requirements for building upon basic scientific knowledge about fundamental physiological
processes at the molecular level.
55 1d. at 5 ("The importance of establishing priority and reputation drove early and
extensive publication of results, and social norms (and requirements of granting agencies)
promoted routine sharing of research materials.").
56 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-11 (1994).
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discoveries.57 Fundamental research discoveries became part of the
public domain through scientific scholarship and publications.58
Unpatented "upstream" discoveries in biotechnology were freely
available as research tools and could be incorporated in
"downstream" discoveries.59
In order to provide for commercialization, the federal government
retained title to these inventions and made them available through
easily obtained nonexclusive licenses.6 ° Under this system, there were
no exclusive rights available to companies wanting to invest in the
development and marketing of new products, and there was no
government-wide policy regarding ownership of inventions that
government contractors and grantees under federal funding made. 6 1
Federally-funded research discoveries were the sole property of the
funding agencies, which were reluctant to permit ownership of
inventions to vest in universities and nonprofit institutions.6 2 Policies
regarding ownership and licensing of new technologies varied among
the various funding agencies, resulting in very limited
commercialization of government-funded inventions because
petitions for property rights had to move through a lengthy and
difficult waiver process. 63 In 1980, the federal government held title
to approximately 28,000 patents,64 of which fewer than 5 percent
were licensed to industry for development and commercialization.65
Thus, although the federal government was supporting nonprofit
research, taxpayers were not realizing any benefits resulting from the
research or the economic development that would have occurred with
the commercialization of research products.
Furthermore, there was no incentive for industry to invest in
nonprofit research. Industrial research partners could not count on
investment returns such as patent rights or exclusive licenses because
of the complexity of research funding, which typically involved
multiple funding sources, including federal grants. Prior to
57 Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 1, at 698-99.
58 Id.; Cockburn, supra note 52, at 4 ("Upstream technology was largely acquired either
'for free' by reading journals and attending conferences, or by purchasing tangible inputs and
services, such as instruments or highly skilled graduates.").
59 Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 1,at 698-99.
60 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 1 (1999).
61 Id. at 2.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Id.

4 Id.
65 Id. (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY
RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES (May 7, 1998)).
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Bayh-Dole, investments in research occurring at an academic or
nonprofit institution would likely end in the federal government
retaining the intellectual property rights.6 6 Without exclusive rights to
the manufacture or sale of the resulting products, there was nothing to
prevent competitors from free-riding on a company's investment after
a product was brought to market. This lack of incentive made industry
reluctant to commercialize government-owned inventions.6 7
Finally, Congress provided for academic of nonprofit institutions
to retain property rights to inventions, with the purpose of promoting
funding from interested industry research partners and ensuring
commercialization of research inventions that federal funding
supports. In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in an effort to
encourage the development and commercialization of inventions
emerging from academic and nonprofit research institutions. Under
the Bayh-Dole Act, universities, nonprofit research institutes, and
small businesses could elect ownership of inventions made under
federal funding. 68 The Bayh-Dole Act provided for certainty of title to
inventions made under federal funding, implementation of uniform
patenting and licensing procedures, and the ability of universities to
grant exclusive licenses. By encouraging universities and other
nonprofit research institution to patent discoveries from research
arising from federally-funded research and development, this policy
benefited the public and the national economy by promoting
innovation and accelerating the development and manufacture of new
products within the United States.69
B. The Response to Bayh-Dole
In response to the Bayh-Dole Act, major research universities and
research institutions such as the National Institutes of Health created
technology-transfer offices to promote and oversee the patenting of
scientific research discoveries.70 In many cases, institutions that had
not been actively patenting or seeking to commercialize inventions
began to establish entirely new technology-transfer offices, consisting
of consultants with legal, business, and scientific backgrounds. 7'
University technology-transfer offices perform a wide variety of
functions including, patenting and licensing of inventions, building
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id.
68 35 U.S.C.
RELATIONS,
69

70

§§ 200-11, 301-07 (1994); see also
supra note 60, at 5.

COUNCIL ON

Id.
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 698-99.

71 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 60, at 2-3.

GOVERNMENTAL
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relationships with industry partners, and negotiating the exchange of
research materials and research tools. 72 In 1980, approximately
twenty-five to thirty universities were actively engaged in patenting
and licensing inventions, and it is estimated that there was
approximately a ten-fold
increase in the number of these institutions
73
from 1980 to 1999.
The number of patents, licenses, and start-up companies coming
out of university technology-transfer offices following the enactment
of the Bayh-Dole Act continues to increase annually. Evidence of this
is reflected in the fact that the membership of the Association
of University Technology Managers (AUTM) increased from 691
in 1989 to 2,178 in 1999. In 1979, the year before passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the Association counted only 113 members.74
The Bayh-Dole Act has also provided a strong incentive for
university-industry research collaborations. 75 "In 1997, federal
agencies provided an estimated $14.3 billion or about 60% of total
support for research performed at universities. Academic institutions
provided $4.5 billion of their funds. State and local governments and
nonprofit organizations each contributed $18.1 billion and industry
$1.7 billion. Although the proportion of academic research and
development expenditures funded by industry has risen steadily, it
represents only a fraction (7%) of total academic research and
development support. ' 7 6
A national survey that AUTM conducted reports that 70 percent of
the active licenses of responding institutions are in the life sciences,
most of which federal funding supports.7 7 The AUTM survey
summarizes the increase in commercialization of inventions at
academic institutions post-Bayh-Dole: (1) academic institutions were
granted more than 8,000 U.S. patents between 1993 and 1997; (2)
over 2,200 new companies have been formed since 1980 that were
based on the licensing of an invention from an academic institution;
(3) approximately thirty billion dollars of economic activity each
year, which supports 250,000 jobs, can be attributed to the
commercialization of new technologies from academic institutions;
(4) more than one thousand products currently on the market are
based on university licensed discoveries; and (5) technologies
72

Id. at 3.

73Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 3; see also THE ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, SURVEYS - BAYH-DOLE ACT,
FISCAL YEAR 1991-1995 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS, available at http://www.autm.net/pubs/
survey/fcts.html [hereinafter AUTM SURVEYS].
75 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 60, at 3.
76 Id. at 12 n.4.
77 AUTM SURVEYS, supra note 74, at Fiscal Year 1997.
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licensed from academia have been instrumental in creating new
industries, improving the productivity and competitiveness of
companies, and creating new companies and jobs.78
Post-Bayh-Dole, commercial biotechnology firms have carved out
an area of specialized research and development somewhere between
the basic scientific research traditionally within the purview of
academic research and the targeted drug and medical-device
development at the level of the large pharmaceutical companies.7 9
Biotechnology firms, for the most part, are for-profit, but they tend to
have much closer contractual ties to nonprofit research institutions.
Academic scientists have had a significant role in the founding of
these companies, either moving out of academic employment or
participating actively in both worlds. 80 Between 25 and 40 percent of
large pharmaceutical companies' sales are now reported as coming
from drugs originated in the biotech sector.81
Some "product" biotechnology companies have entered the
industry as direct horizontal competitors to established firms,
intending to realize profits by using their command of new
techniques and insights from molecular biology to developing
products that will be sold to end users. Other "tool"
companies have inserted themselves into the industry value
chain at the interface between academic research and the
downstream for-profit pharmaceutical firms, with a business
model based on licensing or selling leading edge knowledge,
research tools, or intellectual property to companies
focused on less science-intensive clinical development,
manufacturing, and marketing. By taking over a certain
amount of research activity from both upstream and
downstream entities, these new entrants have forced some
important adjustments in university-industry relations and
ushered in a new "partnering" mode of research.82
There has also been a trend toward privatization of research, in
which research is primarily conducted in private research institutes,
supported by private funding, or privately acquired through
78 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 60, at 9 (citing Press Release,
The Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers (Dec. 17, 1998)).
79 Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 1, at 698.
80 See Cockburn, supra note 52, at 6; see also Zucker et al., Intellectual Human Capital
and the Birth ofUS. BiotechnologyEnterprises, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 290, 290-306 (1998).
81 Cockburn, supranote 52, at 7 (citing CMR INT'L, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
FIGURES (2000)).
82

Id.
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intellectual property rights or licenses. This has removed many
subsequent upstream inventions from the public domain.83 At the
national level, industry support for research and development at
universities represents less than 7 percent of the total funding of
university-based research.8 4 While small compared to the 60 percent
that federal agencies provide, this private investment in the creativity
of universities, including professors, students, and staff, drives a form
of technology transfer that is increasingly important to industry.85
Industrial investment is secure because it is based on the principles
and provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole Act has created
incentives for government, universities, and industry to work together
in the commercialization of new technologies for the public benefit
and has promoted a substantial increase in technology transfer from
universities to industry and, ultimately, to the public. 86
Certainty of intellectual property rights to inventions made under
federal funding also protects the right of scientists to pursue highly
specialized research programs.8 7 Fundamental research is no longer
passed directly into the public domain, where numerous researchers
in diverse fields can use it as a building block. Instead, the Bayh-Dole
Act requires disclosure of patentable inventions and provides
incentive to universities and nonprofit research institutions to patent
early and often. This has led to increased patenting of fundamental
research, or "upstream" inventions, particularly in the area of
biotechnology. These upstream inventions include drug development
targets such as genes and proteins, molecular biology reagents, and
experimental animal systems, which are frequently used as tools or
building blocks for future discoveries. Increased patenting of these
research tools serves to remove them from the public domain, where
they were freely available to the scientific community. This trend has
led scholars to question the potentially inhibiting effects of upstream
patenting of research tools on downstream scientific research, such as
targeted drug development and clinical research.

83 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 698-99 (noting that upstream research is
increasingly private).

COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote 60, at 3.
85 Id.
84

86
87

See id. at 9.
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III. UPSTREAM PATENTING: DOES IT AFFECT NONPROFIT INSTITUTES
AND INDUSTRY ALIKE?

A. "Working Solutions "for Surmounting the Barriersthat Upstream
PatentingPoses
Both the Walsh et al. and Straus studies report that researchers in
the biomedical sciences have developed "working solutions" in
response to restrictions that upstream patenting of research tools pose.
These "working solutions" include traditional practices such as
licensing, inventing around third-party patent claims, creating and
using public databases, and challenging third-party patents in court.
However, despite these practices that respect third-party patent rights,
researchers also admit to ignoring patents, willfully infringing
patents,
and going offshore so as to avoid licensing patented research
88
tools.
Although nonobservance of intellectual property rights may be
effective in some circumstances, downstream infringers face several
types of risks, including detection, prosecution, and liability.89 Patent
infringement may be very difficult to detect, especially in early
research efforts that are never publicized or commercialized. 90
Researchers may ignore patent rights at an early stage of their
research and only seek to obtain a license once a discovery appears to
be worth pursuing. Many researchers feel that research-tool patent
claims are of debatable validity and willfully infringe, under the
assumption that the claims will not hold up in court. 91 In addition,
university researchers routinely ignore patent rights under the
assumption that they are covered by a "research exemption," although
a legal-research exemption is quite narrow and likely applies to few,
if any, of these researchers. 92 Furthermore, even if infringement is
detected, firms are typically reluctant to enforce their patent rights
against nonprofit researcher-infringers because of low damage awards
and bad publicity. Most university researchers want to maintain
collaborations and good relationships with each other, and
universities are not likely to enforce their rights.93 Moreover, the
88 Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 327-28.

89See, e.g., Kara Moorcroft, Scofflaw Science: Avoiding the Anticommons Through
Ignorance, 7 TUL. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 71, 77-79 (2005).
90Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 324.
91See Moorcroft, supra note 89, at 75-79.
92Madey v. Duke Univ., 413 F. Supp. 2d 601 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (holding that the
exemptions are limited only to government directed use); see also Walsh et al., supra note 4, at
324, 335.
13Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 326-27.
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six-year statute of limitations may expire before infringement is
detected. 94 Lastly, patent holders are aware that, even if they bring a
suit against an infringer, the infringer may not be found liable if the
patent claims are held to be invalid or the research exemption is held
to apply.95
In addition to ignoring patents or willfully infringing, another
"working solution" is to conduct the research outside of the United
States, in order to use patented technologies without securing legal
rights to them, thus avoiding licensing costs. 96 This is similar to the
practice of ignoring the patent altogether, except offshore use of the
research tools is not illegal unless a product is developed, and the firm
tries to import the product into the United States.
B. Viable "Working Solutions" Vary Between Nonprofits Institutes
andFor-ProfitFirms
The tragedy of the anticommons is viewed as raising the greatest
potential impediments to researchers at nonprofit institutes and small
biotechnology firms. 9 7 This is because of the low level of funding and

lack of sophistication and support of legal counsel, as compared with
that available to researchers in large for-profit firms. According to the
previously mentioned empirical studies, upstream patenting of
research tools does not create insurmountable barriers to downstream
research. However, if these barriers actually do exist and are
overcome only through the aforementioned "working solutions," it is
likely that the availability and effectiveness of these solutions will
vary between researchers at nonprofit institutes and small
biotechnology firms, compared with large for-profit firms.
Walsh et al. reported that third-party patent concerns do not
preempt research projects in industry. In regard to licensing, Walsh et
al. reported that the total royalty payments for input technologies
associated with drug development range from 1 to 5 percent of sales,
and are higher for exclusive licenses, occasionally reaching 10
percent or higher. 98 Firms may license research tools, such as a gene
for screening or microarray analysis for a set fee ranging from ten
thousand to twenty thousand dollars. 99 Fees for access to genomic
databases may be in the range of tens of millions of dollars, and
94 Id. at 328.

95See Moorcroft, supranote 89, at 78.
96 Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 328.
97 Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 1,at 698-99.
98 Walsh etal., supra note 4, at 300.
99Id.
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occasionally are over one hundred million dollars. 00 Although
manageable by large pharmaceutical firms, and even established
biotechnology firms, licensing fees of this magnitude are prohibitive
to researchers at small start-up companies and nonprofit research
institutions. Some firms offer discounted licensing fees to university
researchers,' 0 ' but this does not appear to be a common practice
across the industry. Additional, non-monetary costs for academic
researchers are publication restrictions that may be attached
to
102
licensing agreements or collaborations with for-profit firms.
While large firms do not usually pursue projects that are
commercially less viable, they state that a plethora of drug targets and
diseases insure that lucrative avenues for commercial research are not
lacking.10 3 Again, these are not options available to nonprofit
researchers confronting patent thickets and royalty stacking or to
those searching for a cure for an orphan disease. Likewise,
conducting research in overseas labs is a solution most likely to be
10 4
employed by for-profit firms, rather than nonprofit institutes.
However, individual researchers may choose to conduct their research
outside of the United States in order to avoid patented or illegal
research tools, as in the case of stem cell research.
This does not mean that nonprofit researchers do not pursue their
own solutions. The practice of simply ignoring third-party patent
rights, or willfully infringing and claiming the shield of a research
exemption, are common practices in academic and nonprofit research.
Researchers view the risks associated with detection, prosecution, and
liability as minimal. 10 5 According to Walsh et al., downstream
research infringers at universities are largely left alone so long as they
are engaged in noncommercial or precommercial research, with the
exception of clinical research using patented diagnostic tests. 10 6 So
long as the researchers are not viewed as competitors, large for-profit
firms feel that the negative publicity and minimal damages, or lack of
damages available, outweighs any advantage in asserting their rights
against university researchers. Some firms will send cease-and-desist
07
letters to nonprofit infringers, but the action usually ends there.'

100Id.

1o ld. at 302.
0
1 2 Id. at 302 n.25.
103Id. at 304-05.
l041d at 328.
105See Moorcroft, supra note 89, at 77-78.
106Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 317-18.
107ld.
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IV. POST-BAYH-DOLE NONPROFIT COMMERCIALIZATION

A. Nonprofit InstitutionsEmerging as IndustrialCompetitors
Post-Bayh-Dole
Jennifer Henderson and John Smith at the Center for Integration of
Medicine and Innovative Technology argue that commercialization of
nonprofit research is an implied mandate of the Bayh-Dole Act.
According to Henderson and Smith:
[t]he combination of Bayh-Dole's, (1) stated goal of
increased public access to federally-funded research, (2)
provision for the transfer of intellectual property to
grantees/contractors, and (3) identification of the crucial role
of industry in transforming ideas into available products and
services, create an implied duty on the part of grant recipients
and government contractors to partner with industry to
commercialize promising federally-funded research. By its
nature, this implied duty transforms the academia-industry
relationship from the traditional view of disparate entities into
a Congressionally-mandated partnership, intended to advance
technology and benefit the public. 108
Since the enactment of Bayh-Dole, universities have become
major players in patenting biotechnology and generating start-up
companies. 10 9 By acquiring property rights in inventions resulting
from federally-funded research, universities and nonprofit institutes
acquire bargaining power and are able to negotiate with for-profit
firms for the commercialization of these inventions, resulting in
revenue and increased research funding for the nonprofits. Although
the number of patents applied for by universities remains small,
compared with large firms, the numbers have risen sharply since
Bayh-Dole was enacted in 1980. Moreover, university-held patents
tend to concentrate in a few utility classes, especially those related to
life sciences and biotechnology." 0 Post-Bayh-Dole, there has been an
eight-fold increase in the number of universities transferring patent
rights to the private sector."' In recent years, universities have
demonstrated that their technology-transfer programs are effective in
licensing inventions from federally-funded research to commercial
108
Henderson & Smith, supra note 3.
'09Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 295.
r0AUd.
I11Henderson & Smith, supra note 3, at 6; see also AUTM SURVEYS, supra note 74.
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partners. 112 In 1999, approximately four thousand new licensing
agreements were executed, and an 11 percent increase was recorded
have been
in 2000.113 As a result, over one thousand products
1 14
use.
public
into
introduced
successfully
and
patented
In addition, patent rights form the foundation of many
biotechnology firms and are responsible for a surge in biotechnology
start-up activity over last two decades.' 15 Approximately 450 new
companies and start-ups were founded in 2000, with approximately
2,200 new companies formed since 1980.116 Post-Bayh-Dole, more
than 1,100 companies have been founded based on NIH and
university research.1 17 These technology partnerships and the patents
on which they are based are particularly important to small
biotechnology companies, which focus their research on breakthrough
technologies that arise from basic biomedical research. Such
companies must have strong patent protection to justify the risk of
investing in early-stage, unproven ideas. With no revenue from
product sales to fund research, most of these firms depend on venture
capital and public market investors. Altogether, technology transfer
under Bayh-Dole activities has generated substantial economic
activity, and has added an estimated forty billion dollars into the U.S.
economy.'18
B. Implications of Non-Profit Commercializationfor Downstream
"Working Solutions"
Although it remains unclear whether upstream patenting impedes
downstream research in the biomedical sciences, it is possible to
speculate on how increasing commercialization of federally-funded
research under Bayh-Dole may affect the "working solutions"
available to nonprofit and academic researchers. Currently, nonprofit
researchers who ignore or willfully infringe third-party patents rely on
their status as non-competitors with for-profit firms. However, the
traditional view of nonprofits being engaged in noncommercial or
precommercial research no longer applies post-Bayh-Dole. Nonprofit
and academic researchers whose research is commercialized or who
12

1 See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote 60.
See AUTM SURVEYS, supranote 74.
113
114
COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 60 (citing AUTM SURVEYS,

supranote 74).
15 Walsh et al., supranote 4, at 287.
116See AUTM SURVEYS, supranote 74.
"7 OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., BAY-DOLE AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 2

(2002). 8
l See Henderson & Smith, supra note 3, at 7.
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enter into partnerships with for-profit firms may find that their
for-profit counterparts now regard them as indirect, or even
direct, competitors. This has led to a growing "push back" from
industry in the form of challenges to patents that universities hold. 1 9
What effect will this have on the "working solutions" nonprofit
and academic researches employ to surmount upstream patenting
barriers? If for-profit firms and other nonprofits or universities bent
on commercialization choose to defend their patent rights against
nonprofit competitors, the risks of infringement associated with
detection, prosecution, and liability increase. These researchers may
not be able to rely on ignorance of upstream patents or the research
exemption to protect themselves from infringement liabilities.
According to Walsh et al., infringement is the most common
"working solution" in the nonprofit sector. 20 If this solution is no
longer viable, nonprofit researchers will have to find alternative
working solutions or face the impediments that upstream researchtool patenting raises.
The alternative "working solutions" that for-profit firms routinely
use are also unlikely to be available to nonprofit researchers.
Although nonprofit researchers may benefit from increased funds and
support of legal counsel through privatization and partnerships with
industry, it is unlikely that commercialization will provide the level of
funding required for nonprofit researchers to pay the exorbitant
licensing fees that large firms charge their competitors. Thus, if
discounted licensing fees are no longer available to nonprofit
researchers, the cost of obtaining essential licenses may be
prohibitive. Likewise, while partnerships with for-profit firms may
make conducting research in overseas labs a feasible solution for
some, it is not likely to become common practice for academics who
have teaching and administrative responsibilities at their home
institutions.
C. Responding to Upstream Patentingin the Non-Profit
CommercialSetting
The commercialization of nonprofit research may force
universities and nonprofit research institutes to address the tragedy of
the anticommons through policy initiatives or by developing new
"working solutions" that do not depend upon their traditional
19Cockbum, supra note 52, at 15; see also, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Depth ChargesAimed at
Columbia's Submarine, 301 Sci. 448, 448 (2003); David Malakoff, Judge Turns Rochester's

Golden Patentinto Lead, 299 Sci. 1638, 1638-39 (2003).
120Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 324.

1366

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4

non-competitive, nonprofit status. Unless these institutions can
provide their researchers monetary and legal support at a level
equivalent to what is available to industrial researchers, they will have
adopt entirely new strategies for surmounting the barriers that
upstream patenting has raised. The greatest resource available to
nonprofits and universities is the large number of similarly placed
institutions and their relationship with government funding agencies.
These institutions could band together as a whole to support
non-commercialized research and the establishment and enforcement
of policy and rules governing industry relationships and intellectual
property rights. 121
By banding together to create policy and set appropriate limits on
industry relations that are vigorously enforced, nonprofit and
academic researchers may be able to establish a position of power
from which to bargain for licensing rights and access to patented
research tools. Universities could agree not to grant exclusive licenses
or other restrictions on upstream discoveries with other researchers.
Universities and nonprofits could review all industry contracts and
reject those that would require excessive secrecy, inhibit discussion,
or permit the corporate sponsor undue influence over the research at
issue.12 2 Likewise, Congress could modify existing legislation to deny
universities the right to grant exclusive licenses on patented
technology developed with the support of federal funds. 23 Increased
government funding could prevent excessive reliance on industry
support, and an adequate and stable level of support could serve to
protect academic values and limit commercialization. 124 Finally,
universities and nonprofits could step back from the brink of
commercialism and retain their non-competitive status.
Patent pools and public domain access offer two possible
mechanisms for dealing with upstream patenting across the
biotechnology industry as a whole. A patent pool is an agreement
between patent owners to cross-license their patent rights to each
other or third parties. 125 Members of the patent pool may receive a
license without paying a royalty or may pay a set fee per patent
claim.' 26 Third parties who are not members may pay a licensing fee
121DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 193 (Princeton University Press 2003).
221d. at 143.
123Id. at 142.
1241d. at 196.
125UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS (2000).

126 Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the BiopharmaceuticalIndustry: The
Role of PatentsandAntitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 845-46 (2001).
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to secure the right to use patented technology. Currently, public
domain databases are growing, and the registration of genetic
sequences with public databases has become commonplace. In the
field of bioinformatics, academic researchers have embraced the
aggressive use of public domain and open source licensing. 127 In part,
this trend toward open domain access may result from the large cost
to all researchers in bioinformatics from fragmentation of data
sources and restrictions on access, such that availability of the whole
outweighs any partial property rights. 128 It is possible that researchers
in biotechnology will also support patent pools or public domain
access to research tools if the potential barriers to research that the
tragedy of the anticommons describes become a reality and begin
to impact downstream research. However, if these barriers
disproportionately affect nonprofit and academic researchers, industry
may not willingly embrace patent pools or the public domain. In this
case, it will be critical for nonprofit and academic researchers to act in
concert to create new "working solutions."
Lastly, if the benefits of commercialization outweigh the
disadvantages for nonprofit and university researchers competing in
the biotechnology field, these institutes may decide to enter fully into
their new role as competitors in the biotechnology marketplace.
Nonprofits and university technology-transfer departments choosing
to strengthen their position as competitors need to seek additional
legal support and education for their researchers. This includes due
diligence in the form of patent searches and mandatory licensing, as
opposed to intentional patent infringement or infringement resulting
from willful blindness on the part of researchers. Likewise, nonprofits
choosing this path must be prepared to rigorously defend their own
intellectual property rights. If nonprofits and universities choose to
become competitors in the biotechnology marketplace, they must be
willing to accept the legal consequences in the form of more frequent
litigation and challenges to the validity of their patents. The increased
legal and administrative costs associated with this path will not be
insignificant. However, if nonprofits and universities want to benefit
economically from patenting under Bayh-Dole, they must be prepared
to reinvest a portion of their profits to support this goal. With
sufficient legal support and education, nonprofits and universities
may be able to meet and overcome the same barriers that upstream
patenting poses to their competitors.

27

1 Cockburn, supranote 52, at 16.
1281d_
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CONCLUSION

It is unclear whether upstream research-tool patenting impedes
downstream research in the biomedical sciences or whether the
"working solutions" that researchers have developed surmount these
impediments. If the working solutions are all that hold the tragedy of
the anticommons at bay, increasing commercialization of nonprofit
research post-Bayh-Dole may affect the "working solutions" available
to nonprofit and academic researchers. When nonprofit researchers
become viewed as commercial competitors in the field of
biotechnology, they may not be able to take advantage of their
"protected" status as non-competitors. If infringement, the common
"working solution" in the nonprofit sector, becomes unviable, the
costs and barriers potentially associated with upstream research-tool
patenting may begin to impede downstream nonprofit research,
making Bayh-Dole a "catch-22" scenario and giving truth to the
tragedy of the anticommons. This may force universities and
nonprofit research institutes to band together to address the tragedy of
the anticommons through policy initiatives or by developing new
"working solutions" that do not depend upon their traditional
non-competitive, nonprofit status.
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